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Abstract. There has been much work on exhibiting mechanisms that implement various bargaining
solutions, in particular the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [24] and the Nash Bargaining solution. Another
well-known and axiomatically well-studied solution is the lexicographic maxmin solution. However,
there is no mechanism known for its implementation. To fill this gap, we construct a mechanism that
implements the lexicographic maxmin solution as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in
the n-player setting. As is standard in the literature on implementation of bargaining solutions, we use
the assumption that any player can grab the entire surplus. Our mechanism consists of a binary game
tree, with each node corresponding to a subgame where the players are allowed to choose between two
outcomes. We characterize novel combinatorial properties of the lexicographic maxmin solution which
are crucial to the design of our mechanism.
1 Introduction
Bargaining situations are encountered everywhere. Wage negotiations between employers and trade
unions, trade pacts between nations, and environmental negotiations between developed and devel-
oping countries are some examples of bargaining that we have seen over the years. Essentially, the
problem is one of choosing a feasible alternative, through cooperation, by a group of entities with
potentially conflicting preferences. As Kalai [18] points out, bargaining theory
“may be viewed as a theory of consensus, because when it is applied it is often assumed that
a final choice can be made if and only if every member of the group supports this choice.”
As bargaining theory inherently deals with the aggregation of peoples’ preferences over a set of
outcomes, it closely resembles the theory of social choice. One aspect that distinguishes the bargain-
ing problem from social choice is the existence of a disagreement outcome which may be invoked
(often by an outside mediator) when the parties involved in bargaining fail to reach consensus. We
provide a formal definition of the bargaining problem in Section 3.
The first question that bargaining attempts to answer is what constitutes a good way of choosing
the consensus outcome. Assuming the preferences of the agents are known to the designer, what
choice should be made? The earliest answer to this question was an axiomatic one: the well known
Nash Bargaining solution [25]. Although originally defined for the 2-player case, the axiomatic
characterization of the Nash solution extends seamlessly to the n-player case.
Another prominent bargaining solution is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [19], which is ob-
tained by replacing Nash’s independence condition by an axiom of monotonicity. The axiomatic
characterization of this solution holds up only when there are two players, and fails to generalize to
the case with n players. A straightforward extension of the 2-player Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to
the n-player case, one which follows the form of the 2-player solution, is not guaranteed to be Pareto
optimal. Henceforth, we refer to this extension as the (n-player) Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
In this paper, we are primarily interested in the lexicographic maxmin solution (see Section
3.1 for a formal definition), as proposed by Sen [34] or Rawls [29]. It is obtained by a repeated
application of the maxmin criterion: first, selecting feasible outcomes that maximize the utility of
the worst-off player, then, among these outcomes, selecting those that maximize the utility of the
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next worst-off player, and so on. The utility gains are measured with respect to the disagreement
point. The lexicographic maxmin solution can also be characterized by a principled extension of the
Kalai-Smorodinsky axioms to the n-player case [16]. Other characterizations of the lexicographic
maxmin solution are also known [8,10].
The lexicographic maxmin solution has also had a long history outside of the literature on
bargaining. It corresponds directly to the notion of maxmin fairness [1, 17] which has been exten-
sively studied in network routing and bandwidth allocation problems [13, 20, 21]. It has also been
studied in relation to the resource allocation [3,12,28] and cake-cutting [9] problems . Allowing for
randomization, these settings are special cases of the bargaining problem we study in this paper,
as discussed in Section 3.
Besides defining good solutions, the other question which bargaining theory deals with is that of
implementation – designing a mechanism which, with no knowledge of the agents’ preferences, still
leads them to the desired solution. However, the players are assumed to have complete information
of the preferences of other players. In other words, we need to construct a game for non-cooperative
agents which results in the right solution in equilibrium. While many solution concepts could
arguably be used in this scenario, the standard approach is to look at subgame perfect equilibria of
repeated games. Bargaining inherently involves repeated interactions between players, of offers and
counter offers, which makes the subgame perfect equilibrium a logical and natural choice for the
solution concept to be employed [14]. Henceforth, we use the term implementation to refer to the
problem of designing a mechanism for which the desired bargaining solution is the unique subgame
perfect outcome, with each player having complete information.
The implementation of most of the aforementioned bargaining solutions has been studied. The
2-player Nash solution can be approximately implemented 1 as the unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium in a game of alternating offers [2]. Of particular interest to us is the approach of Moulin [24]
in implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. The same approach has been generalized to other
solutions such as Nash (and its n-player extension), and relative utilitarian solutions [23, 33]. In
fact, this approach works for any bargaining solution that is the maximizer of some convex function
of the players’ utilities. For instance, the Nash solution is equivalent to maximizing the product
of utilities, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is equivalent to maximizing the minimum among the
players’ utilities, etc. In Section 3.2, we discuss the techniques from the above approach.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no known (subgame perfect) implementation of the lexico-
graphic maxmin solution. There is some work on a repeated arbitration procedure [4] which leads to
the lexicographic maxmin solution in equilibrium. This procedure falls short of an implementation
in that it relies on the designer’s having knowledge of the players’ utility functions – As pointed
out by Bossert and Tan [4],
“The assumption of utility information being available to the decision maker clearly is quite
strong. . . . For instance, it would be useful to consider an environment in which the players
know each other’s utilities, but the arbitrator does not know the players’ utility functions. ”
We tackle exactly this problem, and by utilizing novel combinatorial properties of the lexicographic
maxmin solution, we provide a mechanism for its implementation. We provide a quick overview of
our results and technical contributions in Section 2.
While our mechanism is technically intricate, there are three aspects of it that are interesting
from a practical perspective.
1 with time discounted utilities, in the limit as the discount factor goes to 0.
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1. Our subroutine mechanism (the Knockout mechanism, Section 4.2) is simpler, and interesting
in its own right. When the players are given a choice between the lexicographic maxmin solution
and any other outcome, the Knockout mechanism implements the former.
2. Our mechanism offers insight into the nature of offers and counter offers required to arrive at
the desired solution.
3. The gameplay terminates in log n steps (n is the number of agents) in equilibrium, i.e., when
well-meaning and well-informed agents propose the right solution.
Our mechanism used the standard assumption (Assumption 1) that the space of outcomes
is such that in any player’s best outcome, all the surplus goes to her, and every one else gets
no utility. This assumption is commonplace in the literature on implementation of bargaining
solutions. For example, it is employed in the work by Moulin [24], and the various extensions of
his approach [23, 33]. The bargaining problem without the above assumption is also interesting.
Not much work has been done in this setting, besides the implementation of the Nash Bargaining
solution [15]. We leave as open the problem of implementing any of the various bargaining solutions,
including the lexicographic maxmin solution, absent the assumption that a single player can grab
the entire surplus, or proving that such implementations are impossible.
2 A summary of results and techniques
The problem of interest in this paper can be stated as follows: Given n players, and a convex space
of outcomes, can we design a mechanism, i.e., a repeated game with complete information, for which
the lexicographic maxmin solution (in reference to a disagreement point) is the unique subgame
perfect outcome? Our main result is an affirmative answer to this question.
As mentioned earlier, solving for a subgame perfect equilibrium in this case is necessitated
by the fact that bargaining inherently involves offers and counter offers, and thereby a repeated
game. Because the designer has no knowledge of the players’ preferences, the typical building
blocks of implementation mechanisms are proposals and threats. Nash equilibrium is an inadequate
solution concept for it opens up the possibility of non-credible threats by players, leading to many
meaningless equilibria [32]. On the other hand, implementation in dominant strategies is difficult
for the bargaining problem because we have neither the possibility of side payments (as in VCG
mechanisms) nor the explicit goal of divvying up a finite set of resources as in cake-cutting. The
cake-cutting problem is a special case of our setting, with the disagreement point corresponding
to no one getting any part of the cake. We must note here that for the cake-cutting problem with
piecewise uniform utilities (where the utility of each agent for a unit portion of the cake is either a
global constant or zero), it can be shown that the truthful mechanism of Chen et al. [9] implements
the lexicographic maxmin solution, even though they do not claim it explicitly. However, for piece-
wise linear utilities, there is no truthful mechanism that implements the lexicographic maxmin
solution, to the best of our knowledge. We also note that our mechanism is not coalition-proof.
Similar to the above result of Chen et al. [9], the strategy-proofness of the lexicographic maxmin
solution has been established in a variety of domains with dichotomous preferences [3,12,28]. There
is also very interesting work [22] generalizing, and so unifying, all of the above results.
We design our mechanism in two stages. First, we will consider a simpler problem (see Section
4) - given n players who are offered a choice between the lexicographic maxmin solution u∗ (with
the same disagreement point as before), and some other outcome u, is there a mechanism that
implements u∗?
The mechanism from the above problem will be used as a subroutine in constructing our full
mechanism. We describe this in Section 5. In short, we run a binary tree of games, where each node
corresponds to a mechanism where the players to choose between just two outcomes.
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This outer mechanism is inspired by the mechanism of Howard [15] which implements the Nash
Bargaining solution, although the idea of using a binary tree is novel. A complete description of our
game form requires a total number of rounds of the order of n2 log n overall. Modeling our outer
mechanism analogous to that of the mechanism of Howard [15] (that implements the Nash solution)
would lead to a description with n3 rounds. In fact, our idea of the outer binary tree can be used
to simplify Howard’s mechanism [15] for the implementation of the Nash bargaining solution.
To design our inner subroutine, we need a property that
– distinguishes the lexicographic maxmin solution from any other solution, and
– can be exploited in a such a way that a game form based on it leads to u∗ being necessarily
chosen as the only subgame perfect outcome.
Just the property that the lexicographic maxmin solution dominates every other outcome with
respect to lexicographical ordering is inadequate for the above purpose (discussed in Section 3.2).
Therefore, we identify a novel relation between any two vectors called disagreement dominance.
For any two vectors u,v, the disagreement dominance relation between the two is obtained by
checking the lexicographical dominance relation between the “disagreement projection” of u onto
v and vice versa; where the disagreement projection of u onto v measures the utilities in u just for
those players that prefer v over u. The disagreement dominance relation has the very interesting
property that the lexicographic maxmin solution disagreement dominates every other outcome2.
3 The bargaining problem: Model and Definitions
We now describe the model of the bargaining problem, closely following Moulin [24]). We are given a
finite set of alternatives denoted by A3. These alternatives abstractly correspond to all the possible
discrete outcomes. To make the overall space of outcomes convex, all lotteries over these discrete
outcomes are added as possible outcomes. Let P (A) be the set of probability distributions over A :
P (A) = {l ∈ RA| la ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,
∑
a∈A
la = 1}.
In other words, P (A) is the set of all lotteries over A. An element l of P (A) is attained by a
lottery that randomly selects outcome a with probability la.
The set of agents is denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ N has Von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences over P (A), which can be represented via a vector ui ∈ RA, and her utility
for any lottery l is given by:
Ui(l) =
∑
a∈A
uiala.
An agent i prefers a lottery l over l′ if and only if Ui(l) > Ui(l′). The agents are also assumed
to be risk-neutral.
We are also given an exogenous lottery s∗, called the status quo outcome or disagreement point.
This outcome represents the final outcome in the case where cooperation between agents breaks
down, and they fail to reach a consensus. The designer, or an outside mediator has power to enforce
this outcome in such a situation. We now formally define what is meant by a bargaining solution.
2 To the curious reader: disagreement dominance does not always agree with lexicographic ordering (see the example
at the end of Section 4.1).
3 This can be easily generalized to the case of infinite sets.
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Definition 1 (Bargaining Solution [11]). Given the set of alternatives A, the set of agents N ,
and a status quo point s∗, a bargaining solution is any function that maps any given utility profile
u = (ui)i∈N to a lottery S(u) ∈ P (A), such that
– S(u) is individually rational, i.e.,
∀i ∈ N : Us(s∗) ≤ Ui(S(u)),
– S(u) is invariant under linear transformations of u, i.e., for any scalars αi > 0, and βi
vi = αiu
i + βi1, ∀i ∈ N =⇒ S(v) = S(u),
where 1 ∈ RA is a vector with all components equal to 1.
For any utility profile u, denote by I(u) the set of all individually rational lotteries at u:
I(u) = {l ∈ P (A)| Ui(s∗) ≤ Ui(l) ∀i ∈ N}. (1)
We assume that I(u) is non-empty, and for every u, limit the set of feasible outcomes to I(u).
We only allow those utility profiles u which satisfy the following assumption:
Assumption 1 For any agent i, all her favorite outcomes l∗i ∈ arg maxl∈I(u) Ui(l) are such that
Uj(l
∗
i ) = Uj(s
∗), ∀j 6= i.
This assumption has been indispensably used in the literature on implementation of bargaining
solutions [24,33]. It usually holds for bargaining over private resources such as in fair division and
other problems. We now look at some specific problem instances where the above assumption holds.
Some motivating examples:
(A) Cake-cutting [5,9,30]: Consider a heterogeneous cake given by the interval [0, 1]. Each player i
has a value density function vi : [0, 1]→ [0,∞), and for any piece (a finite union of subintervals)
of the cake X, her utility is given by Vi(X) =
∫
X vi(x)dx. The disagreement point is the
outcome where no player gets any part of the cake. Moreover, if the players are hungry [6], i.e.,
the value density functions vi(.)’s are strictly positive, then Assumption 1 is satisfied – since
the favorite outcome for each player is one where she gets the entire cake, and every other
player gets nothing.
(B) Wireless Relay Networks [7, 27, 35]: Consider a wireless network with many agents communi-
cating with their destinations via a single wireless relay. The relay has a total available power
P , and this has to be divided among the agents. Denote the power allocated to agent i by
Pi, then its quality-of-service – given by the effective SNR(Signal to Noise Ratio) – can be
described as
Vi(Pi) =
aiPi
biPi + 1
,
where ai, bi are agent-specific constants. We omit a discussion of the roots of the above expres-
sion (we point the curious reader to Cao et al. [7] for details).
The disagreement point is given by an allocation of zero power to each agent. The function
Vi(Pi) is strictly monotone in Pi, whereby the best outcome for each agent is where she gets
allocated all the power (i.e. Pi = P ) – thereby satisfying Assumption 1.
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Although we described our model starting with a finite (material) outcome space (and then
taking its convex hull via lotteries), our results can be easily extended to the case where we start with
a infinite set of outcomes. In this case, the space of utility outcomes (see Definition 5) could be any
general convex and compact space (as a subset of Rn). Given a convex and compact space of utility
outcomes, Assumption 1 is also implied indirectly by certain restrictive but natural assumptions –
namely strict convexity and free disposal of utilities [23].
3.1 Lexicographic maxmin solution
To satisfy the axiom of scale-invariance that every bargaining solution must satisfy (see Definition
1), we must use relative utility gains in our definitions. Instead, for the sake for convenience, and
without loss of generality, let us assume the standard normalization of VNM utilities:
∀i ∈ N , Ui(s∗) = 0, and max
l∈I(u)
Ui(l) = 1. (2)
We now define what lexicographical ordering means in general. Given any vector p ∈ Rn, denote
by p(1) ≥ p(2) ≥ . . . ≥ p(n) its components arranged in some non-increasing order. We say p L q
if and only if, for some j, p(j) > q(j), and for ∀i > j, we have p(i) ≥ q(i). And p ∼L q if and only if
∀i, we have p(i) = q(i). We say p L q if and only if p L q or p ∼L q.
Definition 2. The lexicographic maxmin solution is a lottery l∗ such that u(l∗) L u(l) for all
l ∈ p(A).
The existence and uniqueness of such a solution is a consequence of the fact that the space
D = {x ∈ Rn : ∃l ∈ P (A), such that x = [U1(l), U2(l), . . . , Un(l)]} is convex (since P(A) is convex).
We state the following lemma.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique u∗ ∈ D such that u∗ L u for any u 6= u∗.
It is easy to see that the above solution is guaranteed to be Pareto optimal. The Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution in contrast is not guaranteed to be Pareto optimal.
We now illustrate the lexicographic maxmin solution with an example.
Example 4. Consider a three person bargaining problem whose disagreement point s∗ is such that
the utilities of the agents for it is (0, 0, 0). The set of alternatives is given by s∗ and five other points
a, b, c, d, e for which the utilities are (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0.6, 0.6, 0.7), (0.6, 0.6, 0) respectively.
Clearly the lexicographic maxmin solution is (0.6, 0.6, 0.7). The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (see
Appendix A for a definition) here is one that gives utilities (0.6, 0.6, 0.6) to the agents, which is
Pareto dominated.
The lexicographic maxmin solution is uniquely characterized by a set of axioms generalizing
those of Kalai-Smorodinsky [16]. Just for the case of two players, however, the two solutions coincide.
For more than two players, they are different as seen in Example 4.
From here on forward, we will just use the convex space D of utility outcomes, as opposed to
dealing with the space of lotteries. Below, we summarize the relevant definitions in terms of D.
Definition 5. The space of utility outcomes is given by
D = {x ∈ Rn : ∃l ∈ P (A), such that x = [U1(l), U2(l), . . . , Un(l)]}.
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Definition 6 (Lexicographic maxmin solution). The lexicographic maxmin solution is the
unique point u∗ ∈ D such that u∗ L u for all u 6= u∗.
The following restatement of Assumption 1 in terms of the quantity D will be more convenient
for us in the following sections.
Assumption 2 For any agent i, there exists a unique ideal point si ∈ D, and moreover it satisfies
sii = 1,
sij = 0, ∀j 6= i.
The problem of implementing the lexicographic solution can be stated as follows:
Definition 7 (Implementation). Given n players with complete information, collectively the set
N , and the utility space D, a mechanism M(D,N , s∗) is said to implement u∗ if and only if u∗ is
the unique subgame perfect outcome of M(D,N , s∗).
In other words, a mechanism M(D,N , s∗) is said to implement u∗ when M(D,N , s∗) always
admits a subgame perfect equilibrium, and u∗ is the outcome of any such equilibrium.
3.2 Comparison with previous work
The implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is possible via a mechanism that has a single
round of simultaneous bidding, followed by a series of accept/reject decisions by the players [24].
The framework of Moulin’s mechanism [24] has been extended to many other bargaining solutions
[23, 33]. In particular, it is known that any bargaining solution that is equivalent to maximizing a
convex function of the players’ utilities can be implemented as a subgame perfect equilibrium by
a mechanism that does a pass over the entire list of players twice [23]. Such a mechanism works
roughly as follows: In the first pass, each agent gets to propose an outcome, and a corresponding
“bid” (a vector of promised utilities to all the players). These bids are arranged in descending
order according to the desired convex function, and the first player is designated the winner. Each
player then gets to accept the winner’s proposed outcome, or reject it and implement a dictatorial
threat [23]. These games are much simpler than the one we come up with in this paper: the full
description of these game involves a total number of rounds of the order of n.
Because the lexicographic maxmin solution does not correspond to maximizing a convex function
of utilities, the above approach fails to work. A natural question is whether using lexicographic
ordering to order the bids in the above approach solves our problem. In the remainder of this section,
we will describe why this is not the case. We are therefore forced to look for more complicated game
forms. A similar hurdle was faced by Howard [15] in trying to design a mechanism that implements
the Nash solution without the standard assumption that every player grabs all the surplus in her
favorite outcome, while the others get nothing.
Without going into the details of Moulin’s mechanism (that implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution) [24] and other related ones, we would like to illustrate, by way of a concrete example, why
direct extensions of these approaches do not work for the lexicographic maxmin solution. This will
shed light on the complexity of our problem.
A direct extension of Moulin’s mechanism [24] to our problem would roughly be the following:
Each player i declares a bid pi ∈ [0, 1]n, and these are ordered in accordance with lexicographic
ordering. A player whose bid, say p, lexicographically dominates every other bid is declared the
winner, and gets to propose an outcome L in D. Each other player i can either
1. accept L, or,
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2. reject to impose the (lottery) outcome pis
i + (1 − pi)s∗, which gives her a utility of pi, as the
final outcome.
If all players accept L then it becomes the final outcome. Note that when some player rejects,
the utility for the winner, and indeed all others is 0 by Assumption 2.
While the lexicographic maxmin is a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, it’s not the only
equilibrium. The fact that a player can lie about her own utility level in her bid (since it is not
checked by anyone’s threat) leads to many meaningless equilibria. Let’s look at an example to see
why this is the case.
Example 8. Recall the outcome space in Example 4: given 3 players, let the space D be given by
all points in the convex hull of the points
(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0.6, 0.6, 0.7), (0.6, 0.6, 0).
The disagreement point, as usual, is (0, 0, 0).
The lexicographic maxmin solution here is (0.6, 0.6, 0.7).
In the above example, say player 2 bids (0.6, 1, 0.65). Player 1 has no reason to challenge this
bid, as she is guaranteed a utility of 0.6, and there is no point where she can get a higher utility
while ensuring that player 2 gets at least 0.6. If player 3 bids above (lexicographically speaking)
player 2’s bid, and then proposes at outcome where she gets a utility more than 0.55, her proposed
outcome is bound to get rejected by someone. We now explain why this happens.
Even if player 3 bids p such that p3 = 1
4, then the other components in her bid have to together
lexicographically dominate (0.6, 0.65). There is no outcome that ensures these levels of utility for
the other players. Therefore, this leads us to an equilibrium where player 2 wins the bid and can
possibly propose the outcome (0.6, 0.6, 0.65) which is accepted by others.
Note that the above analysis holds even when the bids are done in turn. If the bids are si-
multaneous as in the game of Moulin’s mechanism [24], simpler examples of bad equilibria are
possible.
As a result, current techniques are inadequate to design a mechanism that implements the
lexicographic maxmin.
4 Implementing the lexicographic maxmin solution
Before going into the general problem of implementing the lexicographic maxmin solution, we will
look at a simpler problem: Given u∗ and another outcome u (with the same disagreement point
as before), can we design a mechanism which implements, for any given number of players, the
solution u∗? We answer this question by designing the Knockout mechanism. This mechanism will
be an important subroutine in implementing our full mechanism for the implementation of the
lexicographic maxmin solution.
Let us first characterize a novel combinatorial property of the lexicographic maxmin that will
be of immense use to us.
4.1 Disagreement dominance
As mentioned before, given two utility outcomes, say u and v, we use the disagreement-dominance
relation as a way of comparing the two.
4 There’s no reason to bid less than 1 here, as doing so can only hurt the lexicographic ordering of her whole bid.
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For any pair of utility outcomes, u and v, we define another vector pi(u,v) of the same size,
which we call the disagreement projection of u onto v.
(pi(u,v))i =
{
ui, if ui < vi,
1, otherwise.
We define the disagreement-dominance (D-dominance) relation as follows:
Definition 9 (D-dominance). u D-dominates v if and only if pi(u,v) L pi(v,u). Moreover, if
pi(u,v) L pi(v,u), then u strictly D-dominates v.
The above relation is essentially comparing, in a leximin fashion, the utilities in u of those
agents that prefer v over u, and the utilities in v of those agents that prefer u over v.
The following lemma, which characterizes the relationship between the lexicographical ordering
and the D-dominance relation, is a major technical contribution of this paper.
Lemma 10. The lexicographical maxmin solution u∗ strictly D-dominates any other feasible utility
outcome u, where u 6= u∗.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that u D-dominates u∗, i.e., pi(u,u∗) L pi(u∗,u). We will show
shortly that this assumption leads to the absurdity that 12(u + u
∗) L u∗.
Divide the players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} into three sets X,Y, Z as follows:
X = {i ∈ N : ui > u∗i },
Y = {i ∈ N : u∗i > ui},
Z = {i ∈ N : ui = u∗i }.
Without loss of generality we can assume that both X and Y are non-empty. Of course, both
can’t be empty simultaneously, for then u = u∗. If only Y is empty, then u L u∗, which is an
absurdity. If only X is empty, then u∗ strictly D-dominates u trivially.
Let u∗(1) ≤ u∗(2) ≤ . . . ≤ u∗(n) denote the components of u∗ arranged in non-decreasing order ,
and let σ(k) be the agent corresponding to u∗(k).
Let j be the smallest value such that σ(j) ∈ X ∪ Y , and let u∗σ(j) = α. Since ties can be broken
arbitrarily in the above ordering of the components, assume without loss of generality that
∀j′ ≥ j, u∗σ(j′) > α whenever j′ ∈ Z. (3)
By definition, for j′ < j, we have u∗σ(j) = uσ(j). In addition, if we show that for j
′ ≥ j,
1
2(u
∗
σ(j) + uσ(j)) > α, then
1
2(u
∗ + u) L u∗ which is a contradiction according to Lemma 3.
Let γ = mini∈X u∗i , and δ = mini∈Y ui. Since α = mini∈X∪Y u
∗
i , we have γ ≥ α. Since
pi(u,u∗) L pi(u∗,u), we have mini∈Y ui ≥ mini∈X u∗i , i.e., δ ≥ γ. Combining the above two
arguments, we have δ ≥ α.
In other words, we have
∀i ∈ X, u∗i ≥ α,
∀i ∈ Y, ui ≥ α.
Now consider any j′ ≥ j. There are three possible cases here:
(A) σ(j′) ∈ X: In this case, uσ(j′) > u∗σ(j′), and u∗σ(j′) ≥ α. Therefore 12(u∗σ(j′) + uσ(j′)) > α.
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(B) σ(j′) ∈ Y : In this case, u∗σ(j′) > uσ(j′), and uσ(j′) ≥ α. Therefore 12(u∗σ(j′) + uσ(j′)) > α.
(C) σ(j′) ∈ Z: By our assumption to simplify accounting (equation 3 above), we already have
u∗σ(j′) > α, which automatically means
1
2(u
∗
σ(j′) + uσ(j′)) > α, since u
∗
σ(j′) = uσ(j′). uunionsq
We note here that lexicographic dominance does not imply D-dominance. For example, take
u = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5) and v = (0.3, 0.3, 0.4, 0.1, 0.2). Here u L v but v strictly D-dominates u.
4.2 The Knockout mechanism
Armed with Lemma 10, we first look for a mechanism where the players are given a choice between
u∗ and some other outcome u, with the same disagreement point as before, i.e., s∗. Before we
describe this game, we will need to define the mechanism D(i,p), agent i’s dictatorial mechanism
[24], which comes into force when i rejects a proposal in the overall mechanism.
Definition 11 (D(i,p)). Agent i proposes an outcome Li for unanimous approval by other agents.
If at least one agent rejects Li, the referee enforces the status quo s∗. If everybody accepts Li, the
referee enforces the lottery piL
i + (1− pi)s∗.
A straightforward consequence of Assumption 2 is that the outcome si, i.e., i’s ideal outcome,
is a subgame perfect proposal of i in D(i,p). One might wonder why we could not just have a
provision to directly implement piL
i + (1− pi)s∗ based on player i’s choice of outcome. The point
is that Li could be Pareto-dominated by s∗, and we need a device to ensure individual rationality,
with respect to s∗ being normalized to (0, 0, . . . , 0), when some agent rejects a proposed lottery.
We now define the Knockout mechanism K(X,Y,N ) on a pair of outcomes X,Y , and a set of
players N of size n. The game will be defined recursively.
Knockout Mechanism K(X,Y,N )5
Round 1:
(A) Each players i in turn chooses her preferred outcome Li to be either X or Y .
(B) Each player i bids a vector pi ∈ [0, 1]n in turn6.
(C) The players are re-ordered, with all ties broken lexicographically, such that
p1 L pi, ∀ i 6= 1, and p12 ≤ p13 ≤ . . . p1n,
where pij is the component corresponding to player j in the bid p
i made by player i.
Round j (j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}): Player j has to make a choice between two options which vary
based on the value of her value in player 1’s winning bid, i.e., p1j :
(A) If p1j < 1, then player k can either accept L
1, or reject it. In the latter case, i.e., a rejection by
player j, the game immediately reduces to D(j,p1).
(B) If p1j = 1, the player k can either accept L
1, or reject it. In the latter case, i.e., a rejection by
player j, the game immediately reduces to K(X,Y,N − {1}) (with player 1 ejected).
If player j accepts, then we move on to the next player j + 1, and so on, to player n in round
n. If all players accept and we reach the end of round n, then L1 is the final outcome.
5 Recall that X and Y , like all feasible solutions, satisfy individual rationality with respect to s∗ (see equation 1),
i.e., no player strictly prefers s∗ over either X or Y.
6 Assuming i prefers X over Y , her bid pi here can be thought of as the levels of utility she promises to players who
prefer Y over X. Also, as mentioned in the proof of Lemma 13, simultaneous bidding here leads to the existence
of bad equilibria.
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4.3 Analyzing the Knockout mechanism
The above mechanism implements the lexicographic maxmin solution when it is pitted against any
other outcome. More formally, when one of the outcomes is u∗, the above game admits a subgame
perfect equilibrium, and that any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game results in a payoff of
u∗ to the agents. In fact, we will prove a much stronger property of the Knockout mechanism in
terms of the D-dominance relation.
Theorem 12. If X strictly D-dominates Y , then K(X,Y,N ) implements X.
We first prove the above theorem for the case of n = 2, which will serve as the base case for an
inductive proof of the theorem in all generality. Given two players {1, 2}, and two outcomes X,Y
7, let X{1,2} = (u1, u2) and Y {1,2} = (v1, v2).
Lemma 13. If X{1,2} strictly D-dominates Y {1,2}, then K(X,Y, {1, 2}) implements X.
Proof. Assume that ties are broken in favor of player 2. In Round 1, let’s say player 1 chooses
L1 = A and player 2 chooses L2 = B. The most pertinent case is when 1 strictly prefers A, and 2
strictly prefers B. All other cases follow analogously.
Case (1) A strictly D-dominates B: Now player 1 can bid p1 = pi(A{1,2}, B{1,2}) =
(1, A2). To outbid player 1, player 2 has to bid p
2 = (t, 1) where t ≥ A2. Since
A{1,2} strictly D-dominates B{1,2}, we know that pi(A{1,2}, B{1,2}) L pi(B{1,2}, A{1,2}) ⇐⇒
(1, A2) L (B1, 1) ⇐⇒ A2 > B1. Therefore, player 2’s bid must be such that t > B1, in
which case, player 1 is better off by rejecting, and player 2 gets 0 utility in this case. Consequently,
A is the outcome in this case.
Case (2) B D-dominates A: Now player 1 has to specify some bid p1 = (1, s) such that s ≤ A2,
for otherwise, player 2 will reject and player 1 will get a utility of 0. Recall that ties are broken in
favor of player 2. So player 2 can now outbid player 1, by specifying a bid p2 = (t, 1) such that
B1 ≥ t ≥ A2 ≥ s. This is because we know that in this case, B strictly D-dominates A =⇒ B1 ≥
A2. And in this case, B is the outcome, since player 1 will accept.
Putting these together, we see that in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game from Round
1 on, if A strictly D-dominates B, then A is the outcome (and if not, B is the outcome).
As a result, since X strictly D-dominates Y , we know that at least one of the players strictly
prefers X over Y . Consequently, X is the only possible subgame perfect outcome.
To show that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists, we show that a finite backwards reduction
is possible. Let’s say we are given the choice of L1 and L2 in Round 1(A). While infinite choices
are available for the bids in the round 1(B), each player would not make a bid that gets rejected
in favor of the dictatorial mechanism8. In effect, player 1, for example, is in effect making a choice
between his own choice L1, player 2’s choice L2, and the outcome of the subgame L(X,Y, {2})
(which by definition is equal to player 2’s preferred outcome between X and Y ). As the number of
choices of outcome in each step is effectively finite, the game can be reduced backwards, thereby
guaranteeing the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium. uunionsq
In the case when X D-dominates Y and Y D-dominates X, the outcome depends on how ties
are broken between agents in the bidding phase of the game, and which outcome the winning bidder
prefers.
We now extend the above claim via an inductive argument to prove Theorem 12.
7 Even though we have only 2 players, we let X,Y ∈ [0, 1]n to denote outcomes.
8 This might not hold with simultaneous bidding in the case of more than two players. The equilibrium bids of the
two players could be such that if one lowers his bid the other wins, and a third player rejects regardless of who
wins.
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Proof of Theorem 12. This proof is essentially similar to that of Lemma 13, with some additional
complexities. In what follows, we highlight these differences, and discuss how we can take care of
them. As mentioned before, the proof is an inductive one: an induction on the size of N . Let the
above statement be true for all sets of agents smaller than N . The base case when |N | = 2 holds
by Lemma 13.
Now consider K(X,Y,N ). Let A be the set of agents that strictly prefer X, and B be
the set of agents that strictly prefer Y , and C be the set of agents that are indifferent.
X strictly D-dominates Y necessitates that A is non-empty. If B is empty, then the argument
below holds vacuously. So assume that B is non-empty.
Consider an agent i in A. This agent can choose Li = X and bid pi = pi(X,Y ). If this bid
wins, then any player k in A cannot do better than accepting. Recall that, by way of the labeling
in Round 1(C), we go through the players in increasing order of their components in the winner’s
bid vector. Therefore, only players in A follow k. Also, since pij = Xj for all j ∈ B, any agent in B
cannot do better than accepting either. This follows from the fact that Xj = p
i
j < 1 for all j ∈ B,
and by rejecting, and thereby reducing the game to D(pi, j) (recall Round j(A), for any j ≥ 2, in
the definition of the Knockout mechanism), any such agent j can get at most Xj .
Any agent j in B does not benefit by bidding any p such that p L pi(Y,X), because in this
case, there exists a player k ∈ A such that pk > Xk. Here we have to look at two cases when j wins:
(A) If pk = 1 then the player k will reject j’s proposal and the game will be reduced to K(X,Y,N−
{j}). The outcome of this game by the induction assumption is X, since Xj < Yj , and removing
j from the set of players still ensures XN−{j} strictly D-dominates Y N−{j} 9.
(B) If pk < 1, then player k will reject and the game reduces to D(p, k), the outcome of which has
0 utility for player j.
Thus, in either case, the outcome for player j ∈ B is no better than X. Hence, j would rather
accept i’s proposal of X.
Combining the arguments above, we have that any subgame perfect equilibrium will lead to the
outcome X.
The existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium follows from the fact that a backwards reduction
is possible, using an argument similar to that for Lemma 13. uunionsq
A corollary of the above result, by way of Lemma 10, is that when one of the two allowed outcomes
is u∗, the Knockout mechanism implements u∗.
Corollary 14. For any outcome u 6= u∗, the mechanism K(u∗,u,N ) implements u∗.
5 The outer binary tree mechanism: a recursive system of Knockout games
In this section, we develop a complete mechanism – a binary game tree system with recursive
Knockout games – that implements the lexicographic maxmin solution. On a sidenote, a modified
version of our binary game tree can be used to simplify Howard’s mechanism [15] that implements
the Nash Bargaining solution.
Before describing our outer binary tree mechanism, we extend the definition of the Knockout
mechanism to a game over two subgames, instead of two outcomes. We had defined K(X,Y,N )
as the Knockout mechanism over two outcomes X and Y . Similarly given any two bargaining
games A and B that each produce some outcome, we define the Knockout mechanism K(A,B,N )
9 XS denotes the projection of the n-dimensional X onto the subset of coordinates corresponding to the set of
players S.
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analogously: by replacing the outcomes X and Y in the game tree of K(X,Y,N ) by the pending
outcomes of subgames A and B. In other words, instead of bargaining over the outcomes, the
players bargain over which of the subgames A or B they prefer to play next. We now make the
following simple observation:
Lemma 15. If α and β are the unique subgame perfect outcomes of games A and B, and
α strictly D-dominates β, then α is the unique subgame perfect outcome of K(A,B,N ).
The above lemma is a simple consequence of the backward induction property (see, e.g. Proposition
99.2 in Osborne and Rubinstein [26]) of a subgame perfect equilibrium. We include a proof in
Appendix B for the sake of completeness.
5.1 Defining the outer binary tree mechanism
The outer binary tree mechanism can be defined (see Figure 1) as follows:
– First, each player i in turn chooses an outcome of her choice Pi.
– For the sake of simplicity, assume that n is a power of 2. The game tree10,11 is obtained as
follows: create a source node S1,2,...,n, then its child nodes S1,2,...,n/2 and Sn/2+1,...,n, and so on,
till we reach the leaf nodes S1, S2, . . . , Sn.
– Each leaf node Si is identified with the outcome Pi.
– Given any node X in the above tree, and its child nodes A and B, the game at X is defined
recursively by the Knockout mechanism K(A,B,N ).
– The game-play starts at S1,2,...,n, the game K(S1,2,...,n
2
, Sn
2
+1,...,n,N ) is played, and if12 and when
one of S1,2,...,n
2
or Sn
2
+1,...,n is the chosen outcome, the game moves to the corresponding node,
and so on.
Note that all players are involved at the start of the game-play at every node. The subscripts of
the nodes indicate which of the Si’s are reachable from each of them, and not the players involved.
However, some agents might be temporarily not involved, till the game reaches the next node, or
a player’s dictatorial mechanism (recall Definition 11).
Before analyzing the above mechanism, we make an important note on the intuition behind its
working. Our mechanism, in its entirety, is a recursive system that works like a knockout tournament
in reverse. By a repeated application of Lemma 15, doing a backward induction on the game tree
above is equivalent to running a standard knockout tournament (a` la a tennis grand slam) on the set
{Pi : i ∈ N}, where each pairwise game is decided according to the D-dominance relation between
the outcomes involved.
5.2 Analyzing the binary tree mechanism
Our main result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 16. The binary tree mechanism above implements the lexicographic maxmin solution.
Proof. We prove the above theorem in two parts:
(A) the solution u∗ is a subgame perfect outcome, and
10 The game tree can be modified very easily if n is not a power of 2. Details are deferred to a full version.
11 Also, we are describing not the extensive form of the game tree, but just a scaffold – with Knockout games placed
on each of the nodes of the tree. On the whole, we have a system of recursive Knockout games.
12 The game could also go into a player’s dictatorial mechanism (recall Definition 11) and end there.
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Fig. 1. The outer binary tree mechanism
(B) u∗ is the only possible subgame perfect outcome.
Part (A): Assume all players chooses u∗, except player 1 who chooses some other outcome u. As
a consequence of Corollary 14, the outcome u∗ is implemented in the knockout game K(S1, S2,N )
that is played at the parent node of P1, where S1 = P1 = u and S2 = P2 = u
∗. Since the outcome
at every other leaf node, besides S1 and S2, is u
∗, a repeated application of Lemma 15 tells us that
the outcome at S1,2,...,n is u
∗.
Part (B): Assume we have a subgame perfect equilibrium where not all players choose u∗ in
the first round. In any such equilibrium, any player i is guaranteed a utility of at least u∗i – for if
not, player i can choose u∗, and by a repeated application of Corollary 14 and Lemma 15, we have
that u∗ is the outcome implemented in every subgame node that is reachable from Pi: ultimately
at S1,2,...,n. Since every player i is guaranteed at least u
∗
i in a subgame perfect equilibrium, the only
possible outcome is u∗ (by Lemma 3). uunionsq
6 Discussion
In this paper, we look at a widely studied and well characterized bargaining solution, namely
the lexicographic maxmin solution. Although a lot of work has been done on the implementation
of other major bargaining solutions, there is no known mechanism for the implementation of the
lexicographic maxmin solution. Interestingly, we are able to design such a mechanism by uncovering
and utilizing novel combinatorial properties of the lexicographic maxmin solution. In doing so, we
also make use of the standard assumption in bargaining implementation theory that the space
of outcomes is such that it is possible for each player to grab all the surplus. As we pointed
out earlier, an interesting open problem is to implement any of the various bargaining solutions,
including the lexicographic maxmin solution, without the above assumption, or to prove that such
implementations are impossible – our intuition aligns more with the latter (details deferred to a full
version). It would also be interesting to look at the case where there is uncertainty in the knowledge
that each player has about the utility valuations of other players. We hope this paper fuels more
research in the abovementioned directions.
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A The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
The Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS for short) solution is defined as follows:
Definition 17 (Kalai-Smorodinsky solution). Given a utility profile u, the KS solution is
given by the lottery l ∈ P (A) that satisfies:
∀ j ∈ N, Uj(l)− Uj(s
∗)
max
x∈I(u)
Uj(x)− Uj(s∗) = maxl′∈I(u) mini∈N
Ui(l
′)− Ui(s∗)
max
x∈I(u)
Ui(x)− Ui(s∗) .
In other words, the KS solution is the maximal point that results in the equalization of the
relative utility gains among the agents. The KS solution is obviously individually rational, and it
is easy to see that it is invariant under affine transformations.
The KS solution is not guaranteed to be Pareto optimal. We illustrate this point with an
example.
Example 18. Consider a three person bargaining problem whose disagreement point s∗ is such that
the utilities of the agents for it is (0, 0, 0). The set of alternatives is given by s∗ and five other
points a, b, c, d, e for which the utilities are (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1) respectively.
13 Clearly the set of Pareto optimal lotteries are those that mix between d and e, and any such
must necessarily give utility 1 to the third agent. It is easy to see that the KS solution here is one
that gives utilities (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) to the agents, which is Pareto dominated.
In fact, it is known that for bargaining problems with 3 or more agents, no solution exists that
satisfies the axioms of Pareto efficiency and symmetry together with monotonicity [31].
B Subgame perfect reduction: Proof of Lemma 15
Proof. Given that α strictly D-dominates β, we know that α is the unique subgame perfect outcome
of K(α, β,N ).
Consider the extensive form game tree of the perfect information game K(α, β,N ). Some of the
terminal nodes, say the set A, give the utility outcome α, while some, say the set B, others give
the utility outcome β. Given any two bargaining games A and B that each produce some outcome,
the game tree of the Knockout mechanism K(A,B,N ) by appending the game trees of A and B
to the nodes in A and B, respectively.
Now consider a node a ∈ A in the game tree of K(A,B,N ). Since α is the unique subgame
perfect outcome of game A, we know that a backward induction on the subtree below a, upto a,
yields the outcome α. Similarly, for any node b ∈ B, the same reduction yields the outcome β.
Since the reduced tree obtained from the above step is identical to that of K(α, β,N ), and α is
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of K(α, β,N ), a backward induction on this reduced tree
yields α.
As a result, it must be that a backward induction on the full game tree of K(A,B,N ) also
yields α, whence the claim is proved. uunionsq
13 This example violates Assumption 2. We use it nevertheless for ease of exposition.
